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SECTION 506(c): SHOULD THIRD PARTY
CLAIMANTS HAVE INDEPENDENT
STANDING?
JUSTIN
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INTRODUCTION

The debtor~in~possession hires a marketing agent to find a
buyer for a large piece of machinery that is secured by a lien from
the bank that financed the purchase of the machinery. The market
ing agent works tirelessly and eventually procures a buyer willing to
pay an extremely favorable price for the machinery. Following the
sale of the machinery, however, the debtor~in-possession is forced
to convert the chapter 11 case to a chapter 7 case. The newly ap
pointed chapter 7 trustee determines that the estate lacks sufficient
funds to compensate the marketing agent. The marketing agent re
quests the trustee to commence an action against the bank to re
cover the agent's costs and expenses. The trustee, realizing that any
recovery for the marketing agent from the bank will not increase
the value of the estate, refuses to pursue the action. The marketing
agent appears unable to recover the costs and expenses associated
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with facilitating the sale of the bank's collateral, despite the obvious
benefit to the bank from the marketing agent's efforts. To prevent
the bank from receiving a windfall at the expense of the marketing
agent, should a court permit the marketing agent to commence an
action against the bank to recover the costs related to the sale of
the machinery?
The above described factual scenario (and different variations
on these facts) occurs frequently during chapter 7, chapter 11 and
chapter 13 cases. In an attempt to address such circumstances, the
United States Bankruptcy Code1 ("Bankruptcy Code" or "Code")
provides that "[t]he trustee may recover from property securing an
allowed secured claim the reasonable, necessary costs and expenses
of preserving, or disposing of, such property to the extent of any
benefit to the holder of such claim."2 In other words, section 506( c)
expressly permits the trustee, or debtor-in-possession,3 to recover
the "reasonable" and "necessary" costs of maintaining collateral
which secures the secured creditor's interest, to the extent the se
cured creditor is benefitted by the expenditures. Thus, if a trustee
spends money on appraising, advertising, storing, repairing, and/or
selling the debtor's property subject to a secured claim, the trustee
may surcharge the secured creditor's interest to the extent the se
1. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as
amended at 11 U.S.c. §§ 101-1330 (1988)), amended by Bankruptcy Amendments and
Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 11 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.); Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trust
ees and Family Farmer Bankruptcy
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3088
/'
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.c. and 28 U.S.C.); Retiree Benefits
Bankruptcy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-334, 102 Stat. 610 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.c.); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
11 U.S.c.); Criminal Victims Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-581, 104 Stat. 2865
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.c.); Crime Control Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11
U.S.c. and 28 U.S.c.); Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104
Stat. 5089 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.c. and 28 U.S.c.); Treas
ury, Postal Service and General Government Appropriations Act, 1991, Pub. L. No.
101-509,104 Stat. 1389 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S. C.) [herein
after Bankruptcy Code or Code].
2. 11 U.S.c. § 506(c) (1988).
3. It is undisputed that both the trustee and debtor-in-possession may recover for
the estate under § 506(c). See, e.g., Central States, S.E. and S.W. Areas Pension Fund
v. Robbins (In re Interstate Motor Freight Sys. IMFS, Inc.), 71 B.R. 741, 743 (Bankr.
W.D. Mich. 1987) ("Interstate I") (concluding that Bankruptcy Code § 1107(a) confers
standing upon debtors-in-possession under § 506(c)). In addition, as this Article's title
suggests, other claimants may also share the trustee's § 506(c) standing.
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cured creditor is benefitted by those costS.4 Though it has been sug
gested that any such recovery is ostensibly "for the benefit of the
estate,"5 section 506( c) administrative costs are paid directly to the
section 506(c) claimant from the secured claimholder's interest,
rather than returned to the estate for pro-rata distribution among
the administrative claimants and creditors. Consequently, section
506(c) is a unique section of the Bankruptcy Code because it essen
tially permits "administrative" claimants whose services relate di
rectly to a bankruptcy estate's secured property to step outside the
statutory priority scheme to receive payment for services.
Recognizing the potential efficacy of. a section 506( c) claim,
this Article addresses a particularly troublesome issue: Who has
standing to assert a claim for reasonable and necessary expenses
relating to the disposition of collateral under section 506(c)? Bank
ruptcy courts and courts of appeal have reached differing, fre
quently irreconcilable, conclusions. Some decisions, following the
"express" language of the statute, have limited standing to trustees
and debtors-in-possession. 6 By contrast, other courts, evoking vari
ous equitable considerations, have allowed third parties7 to submit
claims for expenses under section 506(c).8 This Article attempts to
resolve this conflict by exploring the underlying bankruptcy policies
of section 506(c) in relation to other sections of the Code. At the
outset, Part II surveys prior case law under the Bankruptcy Act of
18989 ("Bankruptcy Act") to ascertain the equitable origins of sec
tion 506(c). Part II suggests that, because prior law under the
Bankruptcy Act provided only a hobgoblin of rules devoid of any
coherent method of application, section 506(c) should not be con
strued merely as a codification of "prior law" as suggested by its
4. Not surprisingly, courts have struggled to define the meaning of "reasonable,
necessary costs" under § 506(c). See, e.g., 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY <j[ 506.06 (Law
rence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1993) (discussing methods of determining expenses recover
able by the trustee under § 506(c)).
5. Id. <j[ 506.06, at 506-56 (citing In re Dinsmore Tire Center, Inc., 81 B.R. 136
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987)). The correctness of this assertion is discussed infra at notes
178-86 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 67-104 and accompanying text which discuss decisions limiting
§ 506(c) standing to trustees and debtors-in-possession.
7. This Article employs the term "third party" to include any claimant other than
the trustee or debtor-in-possession. Third parties may be lessors, repair persons, bail
ees, or other parties who may contribute to the preservation or disposition of the collat
eral to the benefit of the secured creditor.
8. See infra notes 105-33 and accompanying text which discuss decisions that al
low third party claimants standing under § 506(c).
9. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978) [hereinafter
Bankruptcy Act].
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legislative history. Part III examines the current division between
decisions limiting standing to the trustee or debtor-in-possession,
and decisions allowing third parties to submit claims. Part IV ex
plores the different bankruptcy policies implicated under section
506(c). In doing so, Part IV addresses the priority of claims, equita
ble distribution of the estate, direct versus derivative standing, and
the equitable powers of bankruptcy courts under the Code in rela
tion to section 506(c). Finally, Part V offers possible solutions to
the current impasse in light of the Bankruptcy Code's goals. Part V
proposes that courts could create a "demand-futile" decisional law
rule that would require third parties to request the trustee to pursue
their section 506( c) claim prior to filing a claim independent of the
trustee. Alternatively, section 506(c) could be amended to extend
standing to third parties in cases where the trustee refused to pur
sue a colorable claim for expenses related to preservation and/or
disposition of the collateral.
I.

THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SECI'ION 506( c)

Bankruptcy Code section 506(c) evolved from both statutory
and common law origins. 10 This section of the Article briefly ex
plores the original ~quitable principles that produced section
506(c), and the provisions in the Bankruptcy Act that implicated
secured creditors' interests in the allocation of expenses for pre
serving or disposing of collateral. Although the standing of admin
istrative claimants was not addressed under the Bankruptcy Act,
decisions applying the Bankruptcy Act indicate that administrative
claimants were permitted, in some circumstances, to petition for ex
penses incurred in preserving the collateral. However, an historical
examination casts considerable doubt upon the utility of applying
pre-1978 Bankruptcy Code law to interpret section 506(c).11

10. See, e.g., In re S & S Indus., Inc., 30 B.R. 395,397 n.1 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
1983) (discussing statutory origins of § 506(c) in § 246 of Chapter X of the Bankruptcy
Act).
11. When construing § 506(c), courts frequently refer to § 506(c)'s legislative his
tory, which states that it merely "codifies current law." S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 68 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5854; H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 357 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6313. An historical
survey demonstrates that "current law" was in such disarray that it could not be codi
fied in a single provision of the Code. See infra notes 140-46 which discuss the difficul
ties with § 506(c)'s legislative history.
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Common Law Origins

The equitable origins of allowing expense reimbursement
under section 506( c) are found in early decisions involving
surcharges against a fund assessed for preserving and administering
the estate. For instance, in Bronson v. La Crosse and Milwaukee
R.R. ,12 the United States Supreme Court addressed a mortgagee's
claim that the United States District Court for the District of Wis
consin lacked the authority to offset the costs of operating a rail
road incurred by the court-appointed receiver against the revenues
of the railroad that were owed to the mortgagee. After considering
the jurisdictional issue regarding the district court's authority,B the
Court articulated an equitable principle that a district court, pend
ing the appeal of its decision, was empowered "to adopt all proper
and judicious measures to protect and preserve" the collateral. 14
Thus, with respect to the railroad, the Court concluded that the dis
trict court could authorize the receiver to operate the railroad
through reasonable expenditures of the railroad's revenues to pre
serve its business value. 15 In doing so, the Bronson Court rejected
the mortgagee's claim that the receiver could not offset reasonable
costs of preserving the railroad against the proceeds to be paid to
the mortgagee. Other United States Supreme Court decisions,
though not citing Bronson, expounded similar broad equitable prin
ciples regarding the offset of administrative costs incurred in pre
serving the value of collateral in the possession of receivers and
trustees. 16
Unfortunately, despite attempts to exercise such equitable
powers, lower courts were unable to articulate a single, coherent
rule for addressing the allocation of expenses in the preservation of
collateral during a bankruptcy proceeding. Indeed, as one com
mentator has noted, "hardly any phase of the bankruptcy law has
been plagued with so many inconsistent generalities, irreconcilable
rules and principles, disagreements between circuits and even
within circuits (apparently without any awareness thereof) and
loose, indiscriminate statement of rules and citations of author
12. 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 405 (1863).
13. Id. at 408-10.
14. Id. at 410.
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., Adair v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 303 U.S. 350, 360-62
(1938); Wright v. Vinton Branch of the Mountain Trust Bank, 300 U.S. 440, 469 (1937);
Randolph v. Scruggs, 190 U.S. 533, 538-39 (1903); Louisville, Evansville & St. Louis
R.R. v. Wilson, 138 U.S. SOl, 507 (1891); Shepherd v. Pepper, 133 U.S. 626, 652 (1890).
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ity."17 Nevertheless, courts formulated a number of general consid
erations to guide judicial inquiries into the propriety of assessing
the costs of preserving and disposing of collateral against the pro
ceeds from the collateral when insufficient funds existed to satisfy
the outstanding secured claims.Is
In particular, courts emphasized two concerns: 19 (1) the meth
ods of assessing costs against the secured creditor; and (2) the types
of costs properly imposed on the collateral. Apparently, the iden
tity of the claimant for administrative costs (receiver, trustee or ad
ministrative third party claimant) did not factor into the courts'
determinations. 20
1.

Theories for Assessing Costs Against a Secured Creditor

Prior to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code, courts applied
a variety of rationales to charge the costs of preservation and sale of
collateral against the secured creditor. 21 In particular, courts ex
amined the benefit of the sale to the secured creditor,22 the costs
17. 4B COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY en 70.99, at 1224-25 (James Wm. Moore ed.,
14th ed. 1978).
18. See generally 6 HAROLD REMINGTON, A TREATISE ON THE BANKRUPTCY
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 2606-10 (5th ed. 1952) (discussing different grounds for
requiring a lienholder to bear a proportionate amount of the expenses of preserving
and liquidating its collateral).
.
19. See generally Leigh H. Savage, The Secured Claimholder's Liability for the
Costs and Expenses Incurred in Bankruptcy, 90 COM. L.J. 430, 430-34 (1985) (surveying
decisions under the Bankruptcy Act that addressed the application of collateral pro
ceeds against costs of administration of the collateral); J. Hobson Presley, Note, The
Cost of Realization by a Secured Creditor in Bankruptcy, 28 VAND. L. REV. 1091, 1098
1120 (1975); C.c. Marval, Annotation, Imposition upon Lien Creditor of Expenses,
Other Than Referee'S and Trustee's Commissions, Attributable to Bankruptcy Sale Free
from Liens, 48 A.L.R.2d 1343, 1353-68 (1956); Note, Allocation of Expenses Incurred in
a Bankruptcy Sale Free of Liens, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 845, 847-54 (1953) [hereinafter
Note, Allocation of Expenses].
20. In several decisions, administrative claimants, usually attorneys for the re
ceiver or trustee, petitioned courts for allowance of fees from the proceeds of secured
collateral independently from the trustee or receiver. See In re Rice Leghorn Farm, 113
F. Supp. 903 (W.O. Mo. 1953); In re Louisville Storage Co., 21 F. Supp. 897 (W.O. Ky.
1936), affd sub nom. Louisville Title Mortgage Co. v. Louisville Storage Co., 93 F.2d
1008 (6th Cir. 1938); In re Huddleston, 167 F. 428 (S.O. Ga. 1908). For a discussion of
administrative claimants' standing under the Bankruptcy Act's equitable rules, see infra
notes 56-66 and accompanying text.
21. See Presley, supra note 19, at 1098-1113.
22. See, e.g., Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Cohen (Tn re Burch), 179 F.2d 773, 776
(10th Cir. 1950) (reasoning that costs should be charged only if secured creditor is
benefitted); In re Rauch, 226 F. 982, 984 (E.O. Va. 1915), affd sub nom. Lott v. Sals
bury, 237 F. 191 (4th Cir. 1916) (allowing fees for referee's attorney that benefitted
mortgagee's interest); In re Alaska Fishing & Oev. Co., 167 F. 875, 879 (W.O. Wash.
1909) (allowing cost of preserving mortgagee's collateral); In re Goldville Mfg. Co., 123
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incurred in a state foreclosure proceeding,23 the consent of the se
cured creditor,24 the value of the estate after satisfying secured
claims,25 and the secured creditor's request for specific foreclosure
procedures. 26 In some cases, a particular approach would disposi
tively resolve the court's inquiry.27 In other cases, however, courts
applied several factors in determining the lienor's liability for
F. 579, 584-85 (D.S.C. 1903) (refusing to charge mortgagees' interest with costs not
incurred for their benefit); see also Marval, supra note 19, at 1355-59 (surveying numer
ous decisions).
23. See, e.g., Textile Banking Co. v. Widener, 265 F.2d 446, 452-54 (4th Cir. 1959)
(adopting state foreclosure costs approach to assessing costs against secured creditor);
L. Maxcy, Inc. v. Walker (In re Lake Nursery Co.), 119 F.2d 535, 536 (5th Cir. 1941);
Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass'n v. Harrison (In re Williams' Estate), 156 F. 934, 939
(9th Cir. 1907); Ridgely Nafl Bank v. Matheny (In re Utt), 105 F. 754, 759 (7th Cir.
1901). Despite agreeing on the general theory, courts adopting the state foreclosure
method for assessing costs were unable to agree upon which state foreclosure costs
should be charged to the secured creditor's interest. See generally, Note, Allocation of
Expenses, supra note 19, at 857-58 (discussing various methods of computing state fore
closure costs adopted by different courts).
24. See, e.g., Byrer v. Bushong (In re Snyder), 108 F.2d 594, 596 (4th Cir. 1940)
(reasoning that the lienor could be charged with all expenses to which it consented);
Miners Sav. Bank v. Joyce, 97 F.2d 973, 977 (3d Cir. 1938); Virginia Sec. Corp. v. Patrick
Orchards, Inc., 20 F.2d 78,81 (4th Cir. 1927); In re Beardsley, 38 F. Supp. 799, 803 (D.
Md. 1941); In re Baughman, 163 F. 669, 670-71 (D.S.C. 1908). It remained unclear,
however, what type of conduct was required to indicate whether the lienholder con
sented. Compare In re Torchia, 188 F. 207, 208 (3d Cir. 1911) (finding failure to object
equivalent to affirmative consent) with In re Tele-Tone Radio Corp., 133 F. Supp. 739,
749 (D.N.J. 1955) (reasoning that lienor's failure to request sale constituted refusal of
consent). Moreover, courts frequently considered the lienor's consent while evaluating
other factors, such as the existence of a surplus in the estate. See Presley, supra note 19,
at 1109. At best, the meaning of consent to the sale of collateral remained a difficult
yardstick to measure the appropriate costs to be assessed against the lienor.
25. See, e.g., In re Street, 184 F.2d 710, 711 (3d Cir. 1950) (considering whether a
surplus existed in estate prior to assessing costs against lienor); Rubenstein v. Nourse,
70 F.2d 482, 484-85 (8th Cir. 1934) (concluding that if a surplus exists, the lienor's inter
est cannot be charged with costs); In re Myers, 24 F.2d 349, 351 (2d Cir. 1928) (consid
ering effect of estate surplus when imposing costs on lienor); In re J.C. Wilson & Co.,
252 F. 631, 656 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
Other decisions, however, have declined to consider whether the debtor's estate
contains a surplus when calculating costs to be assessed against the secured party. See
Gugel v. New Orleans Nafl Bank, 239 F. 676 (5th Cir. 1917); Anheuser-Busch Brewing
Ass'n v. Harrison (In re Williams' Estate), 156 F. 934 (9th Cir. 1907).
26. See, e.g., In re Louisville Storage Co., 21 F. Supp. 897, 899 (W.D. Ky. 1936)
(reasoning that specific requests for procedures are for the lienor's benefit), affd sub
nom. Louisville Title Mortgage Co. v. Louisville Storage Co., 93 F.2d 1008 (6th Cir.
1938). See generally Presley, supra note 19, at 1113 (discussing the effect of a secured
creditor's specific requests in proceeding relating to collateral).
27. See, e.g., Gugel, 239 F. at 679 (applying solely the state foreclosure cost the
ory); In re Baskind, 43 F. Supp. 602,602-03 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) (considering only the lie
nor's consent to the sale).
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costS.28 Unfortunately, though undoubtedly seeking equitable out
comes for both secured and unsecured creditors, courts failed to
enunciate any determinative policy beyond the needs of the partic
ular parties. 29 This ad hoc approach to resolving factually complex
claims between trustees, referees, unsecured creditors, and secured
lienholders offered little judicial guidance or predictability for the
parties involved. Commentators, recognizing "the inadequacy of
the present state of the law,"30 argued that courts should adopt a
single approach to determine the appropriate method for measur
ing costs against a secured lienholder. 31
2.

Types of Costs Imposed on Collateral

Rather than considering the methods of assessing costs,32 some
courts focussed on the types of costs to determine whether the se
cured lienor should be charged. 33 Unfortunately, courts applying
this approach also failed to articulate any comprehensive rationale
for allowing a particular type of expense while denying other types
of expenses. 34 Instead, the case law offered only conclusory cat ego
28. See, e.g., Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Rhodes, 214 F.2d 606, 607 (5th Cir.
1954) (considering both state foreclosure theory and the lienor's consent); In re Ste
phen R. Jackson & Co., 82 F. Supp. 966, 968 (D. Del. 1949) (considering both the estate
surplus theory and the lienor's consent).
29. See Presley, supra note 19, at 1098.
30. Id. at 1124.
31. See Note, Allocation of Expenses, supra note 20, at 858 (expressing the need
for "some clarity and consistency [to] be injected into this phase of law"); cf Presley,
supra note 19, at 1125 (recommending an amendment to the Bankruptcy Act to resolve
the conflicting decisions).
32. See supra notes 21-31 which discuss methods of ascertaining valid costs.
33. See Note, Allocation of Expenses, supra note 19, at 847-50 (surveying deci
sions which examined the types of expenses incurred by the estate).
34. Courts recognized the nature of the competing claims in allowing claims
against the lienor's interest. For example, in In re Vulcan Foundry & Mach. Co., 180 F.
671 (3d Cir. 1910), the court noted that "where it is sought to charge a lienholder with
the cost of preserving and administering the incumbered property, as distinguished
from the cost of its sale, it becomes necessary to consider the particular situation with
great care." Id. at 673. After recognizing the importance of the lienor's secured inter
ests, the court stated the following:
We do not attempt to lay down a general rule to cover all cases. This
would obviously be impracticable, but we think it is safe to say that the holders
of liens are ordinarily entitled to judge for themselves what their interests may
require, and that these interests cannot be affected without their consent in
the effort to benefit persons whose rights are inferior to their own.
Id.
Despite the Vulcan Foundry court's willingness to recognize the complexity of the
question, this case, and subsequent decisions, avoided the task of articulating an equita
ble theory explaining on what groullds particular costs should receive preferred treat
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rizations such as "general administrative expenses,"35 "costs of
sale,"36 and "costs of preservation."37
On a case by case basis, courts determined that "general ad
ministrative expenses" included expenses of receivership,38
trustee's fees,39 attorneys' fees,40 "or other expenses incurred solely
in the interest of third persons or general creditors and unnecessary
to protection or realization of security."41 Without exception, if a
court classified an expense as a "general administrative cost," the
expense would not be recoverable against the lienor's interest. 42 By
contrast, the costs of selling the collateral, as well as the costs of
preserving its value prior to sale, were generally recoverable. 43 Un
fortunately, expenses characterized as "general administrative
costs" by one court were frequently viewed as essential to the
"preservation" of the collateral by another court.44 Thus, even the
factual distinctions between decisions became blurred. Essentially,
prior to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code, courts assessed
ment. Instead, courts adopted a patchwork of equitable rules, selected as the specific
circumstances warranted. One commentator, describing the hobgoblin of decisional
law, noted, "[e]ven equitable principles have [some] general continuity, uniformity and
consistency." See 4B COLLIER, supra note 17, 'II 70.99, at 1224. In this context, the
principles of allocation of expenses failed to evolve with any certainty or coherence. Id.
35. See, e.g., In re Prindible, 115 F.2d 21, 24 (3d Cir. 1940) (concluding that gen
eral costs of administration are not chargeable against secured lienor's interest); Sea
board Nat'l Bank v. Rogers Milk Prod. Co., 21 F.2d 414, 417 (2d Cir. 1927); In re Hagin,
21 F.2d 434, 438-39 (E.D. La. 1927), affd sub nom. Phoenix Bldg. & Homestead Ass'n
v. E. A. Carrere's Sons, 33 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 726 (1930); In
re Howard, 207 F. 402, 413-14 (N.D.N.Y. 1913).
36. See, e.g., Miners Sav. Bank v. Joyce, 97 F.2d 973, 976 (3d Cir. 1938) (finding
secured lienor liable for costs of sale of COllateral); In re Danielle Co., 117 F. Supp. 178
(D.P.R. 1953); In re Beardsley, 38 F. Supp. 799, 803 (D. Md. 1941); In re New York &
Philadelphia Package Co., 225 F. 219, 224-25 (D.N.J. 1915).
37. See In re Chambersburg Silk Mfg. Co., 190 F. 411, 412-13 (M.D. Pa. 1911)
(allowing costs of watchman to protect collateral); In re Prince & Walter, 131 F. 546,
551 (M.D. Pa. 1904) (permitting expenses of operating debtor's hotel prior to sale).
38. In re Bourlier Cornice & Roofing Co., 133 F. 958, 963-64 (W.D. Ky. 1905).
39. See In re Rauch, 226 F. 982, 984 (E.D. Va. 1915), affd sub nom. Lott v. Sals
bury, 237 F. 191 (4th Cir. 1916).
40. See Liddon & Bro. v. Smith, 135 F. 43, 46-47 (5th Cir. 1905); In re Howard,
207 F. 402, 418 (N.D.N.Y. 1913).
.
41. 6 REMINGTON, supra note 18, § 2609, at 138.
42. See Note, Allocation of Expenses, supra note 19, at 847-48.
43. Id. at 848-49; see also Presley, supra note 19, at 1114-16 (discussing recover
able types of costs).
44. Compare In re Mark Shoe Co., 289 F. 74,74-75 (D. Mass. 1923) (concluding
that rent costs involved in carrying on the mortgagor's business were general costs of
administration) with In re Prince & Walter, 131 F. 546,551 (M.D. Pa. 1904) (reasoning
that the expenses involved in operating the mortgagor's hotel were vital to preserving
the value of the collateral).
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claims for expenses against the secured lienor's interest in the col
lateral on an ad hoc basis. Prior decisional law, therefore, offers
little coherence or predictability to post-Bankruptcy Code courts
considering claims under section 506(c).
B.

Statutory Origins

In addition to its common law genesis, section 506(c) evolved,
in part, from section 246 of the Bankruptcy Act. 45 Section 246 per
mitted a judge to allow reasonable compensation for costs incurred
in an unsuccessful reorganization under Chapter X.46 Despite the
statutory language, it remained unclear whether the lienor's interest
could be charged with the costs of an abortive reorganization under
section 246. 47
In Centralia Refining Co. ,48 a debtor filed a voluntary petition
for reorganization under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act. After
approving the petition, the court authorized the trustee to employ
watchmen and purchase insurance to protect the value of the prop
erty.49 The court found, however, that the debtor's plan of reorgan
ization was not feasible. The court then ordered a liquidation of the
debtor's assets under section 238 of the Bankruptcy Act. Because
the value of the claims exceeded the debtor's assets, the trustee
sought to charge the administrative costs against the lienor's
.
interest. 5o
The court recognized two opposing rules: (1) a lienholder must
bear expenses incurred for its benefit or to which it consents;51 and
(2) a mortgage lien may not be impaired in a 77B reorganization
proceeding before a final plan of reorganization has been ap
proved. 52 Without reconciling these ostensibly opposing concepts,
the court concluded that the lienholder had not consented to gen
eral expenses such as court costs, trustee fees, auditor fees, and at
45. See 11 u.s.c. § 646 (1938 & Supp. V 1935-39) (repealed 1978).
46. See id.
47. See generally Seymour J. Rubin, Allocation of Reorganization Expenses, 51
YALE L.J. 418, 419-24 (1942) (discussing different approaches to expenses under § 246).
48. In re Centralia Refining Co., 35 F. Supp. 599 (E.D. III. 1940).
49. Id. at 600.
50. Id. at 60l.
51. Id. at 602 (citing In re Louisville Storage Co., 21 F. Supp. 897 (W.O. Ky.
1936), affd sub nom. Louisville Title Mortgage Co. v. Louisville Storage Co., 93 F.2d
1008 (6th Cir. 1938)).
52. Id. (citing Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Haight (In re Forty-One Thirty-Six
Wilcox Bldg. Corp.), 100 F.2d 588, 593 (7th Cir. 1938)).
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torney fees. 53 Accordingly, such expenses were not recoverable
against the lienholder's interest. 54 However, the specific costs of
watchman's fees and insurance, which preserved the value of the
collateral, were recoverable. 55 The court offered no explanation for
following common law concepts under section 246 of the Bank
ruptcy Act.

c.

Identity of the Claimant for Expenses

Apparently, courts were not concerned with the identity of the
claimant for expenses under Bankruptcy Act section 246 or in liqui
dation proceedings. In most cases, the trustee or receiver peti
tioned the court for the administrative claimant. But in other cases
the administrative claimant petitioned the court directly to recover
costs from the lienor's interest. 56 For example, in Louisville Storage
Co. ,57 attorneys for the debtor's receiver sought to recover fees and
costs incurred during the debtor's attempted reorganization. 58 The
court observed that "[ilt has always been the rule inherent in gen
eral principles of equity that the lienor must bear the expense of
bankruptcy administration which is solely for his benefit, or to
which he consents, or which he causes."59 Thus, because the
lienholder had requested the appointment of the receiver, the court
concluded "that costs and expenses incurred by reason of the con
duct of the lienholder are for his benefit, and he will be required to
pay them out of his part of the estate if there are no other assets
belonging to the bankrupt out of which they may be discharged."60
Evidently, the court was unconcerned that administrative claimants
had sought to recover fees without the trustee's participation.
Furthermore, one commentator has suggested that equitable
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See In re Rice Leghorn Farm, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 903 (W.D. Mo. 1953); In re
Louisville Storage Co., 21 F. Supp. 897 (W.D. Ky. 1936), affd sub nom. Louisville Title
Mortgage Co. v. Louisville Storage Co., 93 F.2d 1008 (6th Cir. 1938); In re Huddleston,
167 F. 428 (S.D. Ga. 1908).
57. In re Louisville Storage Co., 21 F. Supp. 897 (W.D. Ky. 1936), affd sub nom.
Louisville Title Mortgage Co. v. Louisville Storage Co., 93 F.2d 1008 (6th Cir. 1938).
58. Id. at 898.
59. Id. at 899. This rule, of course, echoes the principles discussed supra notes 12
16 and accompanying text.
60. Id. Interestingly, the court applied two methods of calculating recoverable
costs for the receiver's attorneys. The court considered the lienholder's consent in the
attorney's participation, as well as the surplus remaining in the estate, to determine if
the lienholder could be charged with the attorney's expenses. Id.

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

12

[Vol. 16:1

principles from early bankruptcy laws encouraged third party claim
ants to pursue claims for expenses related to preserving the collat
era1. 61 The source of this equitable authority is Justice Stone's
opinion in New York Dock Co. v. Steamship Poznan. 62 In that deci
sion, Justice Stone noted that "[t]he most elementary notion of jus
tice would seem to require that services or property furnished upon
the authority of the court or its officer, acting within his authority,
for the common benefit of those interested in a fund ... should be
paid from the fund as an 'expense of justice."'63 This language has
been interpreted as an expansive view of standing for third party
claimants under section 506(c).64 Specifically, Justice Stone's "sen
timent certainly implies that the name of the movant is irrelevant,
so long as the service to the 'common func;l' was necessary and
proper."65 Thus, it appears that courts concerned themselves more
with the merits of the claim, rather than the identity of the party
bringing the claim.
In summary, section 506(c)'s history is fraught with inconsis
tencies and generalizations. It offers little guidance in evaluating
the merits of granting, or denying, third party standing to section
506(c) claimants. More significantly, however, it casts considerable
doubt upon the usefulness of section 506( c) 's legislative history,
which suggests that section 506(c) merely codified "prior law." If,
in fact, section 506(c) merely embodied prior law, courts should not
hesitate to extend third party standing based upon decisions that
permitted such independent claims by third parties. 66 However, be
cause third party standing was not directly addressed, an historical
approach provides an unpersuasive and unsatisfying resolution to
this issue. This Article, therefore, confronts section 506( c) standing
from a current perspective under the Bankruptcy Code.

61. See David Gray Carlson, Secured Creditors and Expenses of Bankruptcy Ad
ministration, 70 N.C. L. REV. 417, 431 (1992).
62.

274 U.S. 117 (1927).
63. Id. at 121.
64. See Carlson, supra note 61, at 431. It is also worth noting that Justice Stone's
opinion in Steamship Poznan echoes the same equitable language expressed in Bronson
v. La Crosse & Milwaukee R.R., 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 405 (1863). For a discussion of Bron
son and other early decisions addressing the equitable origins of § 506(c), see supra
notes 12-16 and accompanying text.
65. Carlson, supra note 61, at 431.
66. See supra note 56.
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506( C)

STANDING

This section of the Article outlines several judicial decisions
that reach opposite conclusions regarding the standing of third
party claimants under section 506(c). Initially, it addresses deci
sions that have rejected third party standing on various grounds.
Thereafter, it examines decisions that have reached· the opposite
conclusion and permitted third parties to submit claims for
expenses.
A.

Section 506(c) Standing Limited to Trustee or Debtor-in
Possession

Since the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code, many courts
have refused to extend standing under section 506(c) to third party
claimants. 67 Some of these decisions have accepted, without signifi
cant explanation, the conclusions reached in prior cases denying
standing. 68 Other courts, recognizing the division of authority, have
offered principled reasons for reaching their conclusions.69 In par
ticular, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western Dis
trict of Michigan has offered a thorough and insightful analysis of
67. See Piedmont Farm Credit, ACA v. G & M Milling Co. (In re Caldwell), 147
B.R. 119 (M.D.N.C. 1992); Kessler, Inc. v. United States Trustee (In re Kessler, Inc.),
142 B.R. 796 (W.D. Mich. 1992); In re Oakland Care Ctr., Inc., 142 B.R. 791 (E.D.
Mich. 1992); Boyd v. Dock's Corner Assocs. (In re Great N. Forest Prods., Inc.), 135
B.R. 46 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1991); White Front Feed & Seed, Div. of Paul Lammers &
Sons, Inc. v. State Nat'l Bank (In re Ramaker), 117 B.R. 959 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1990);
Central States, S.E. and S.W. Pension Fund v. Robbins (In re Interstate Motor Freight
Sys., IMFS, Inc.), 86 B.R. 500 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1988) ("Interstate II"); Central
States, S.E. and S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Robbins (In re Interstate Motor Freight
Sys., IMFS, Inc.), 71 B.R. 741 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987) ("Interstate I"); In re Dakota
Lay'd Eggs, 68 B.R. 975 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1987); In re J.R. Research, Inc., 65 B.R. 747
(Bankr. D. Utah 1986); In re Groves Farms, Inc., 64 B.R. 276 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1986);
In re Wyckoff, 52 B.R. 164 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1985); In re Air Ctr., Inc., 48 B.R. 693
(Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1985); In re Fabian, 46 B.R. 139 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985); In re
Proto-Specialties, Inc., 43 B.R. 81 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1984); In re New England Carpet
Co., 28 B.R. 766 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1983), affd sub nom. Gravel, Shea & Wright, Ltd. v.
New England Carpet Co. (In re New England Carpet Co.), 38 B.R. 703 (D.C. Vt.), affd
sub nom. Gravel, Shea & Wright, Ltd. v. Bank of New England (In re New England
Carpet Co.), 744 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1984); In re Codesco, Inc., 18 B.R. 225 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1982). It is interesting that no circuit courts of appeal have adopted this posi
tion as expressed by the lower bankruptcy and district courts.
68. See Groves Farms, 64 B.R. at 277; Fabian, 46 B.R. at 141; Proto-Specialties, 43
B.R. at 83.
69. See Caldwell, 147 B.R. at 120-21; Great N. Forest Prods., 135 B.R. at 62-70;
Ramaker, 117 B.R. at 965-67.
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the concerns presented by this issue. 7o
In Great Northern Forest Products, a chapter 7 trustee sought
to invalidate a lien on equipment and inventory asserted by the
debtor's landlord.71 Prior to the landlord's assertion of the lien, a
bank had properly filed and perfected the only security interest on
the debtor's machinery, equipment, and inventory.72 The landlord
claimed that the debtor's use of the real property73 had caused sig
nificant environmental damage" for which the landlord could be
held liable under state and federal environmentallaws. 74 The land
lord argued that, because the debtor's estate lacked sufficient assets
to satisfy the lien, the landlord was entitled to charge the bank's
secured interest under section 506(c) for unpaid rent and the costs
of necessary environmental cleanup.75 The trustee contended that
the landlord lacked standing to charge the bank's interest. 76
Initially, the Great Northern Forest Products court recognized
the division of authority regarding standing under section 506(c).77
The court then examined three distinct aspects of the section 506( c)
standing issue: (1) the language of section 506(c);78 (2) the pro-rata
distribution policy of section 726(b );79 and (3) the distinction be
tween direct and derivative standing. 80
With respect to the language of section 506(c), the court ap
plied two rules of statutory construction. 81 Specifically, the court
noted:
If the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent, there is no
need to inquire beyond the plain language of the statute. If the

language is clear, "the sole function of the court is to enforce it
according to its terms." This rule is conclusive "except in rare
70. See Great N. Forest Prods., 135 B.R. at 62-70. In fact, the Bankruptcy Court.
for the Western District of Michigan has considered the issue of § 506(c) standing on
several occasions. See Interstate I, 71 B.R. at 742-46; Wyckoff, 52 B.R. at 167-68. The
court has reached the same conclusion denying the third party claimant standing in each
decision.
71. Great N. Forest Prods., 135 B.R. at 51.
72. Id. at 50-51.
73. The debtor used the property for treating harvested timber prior to process
ing the wood. Id. at 53.
74. Id. at 57.
75. Id. at 62.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 62-63.
78. Id. at 64-65.
79. Id. at 66.
80. Id. at 68.
81. Id. at 64-65.
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cases where the literal application of a statute will produce a re
sult demonstrably at odds with the intention of the drafters[.]" In
such a rare situation where the statute appears to contravene in
tent or conflict with other statutes, courts must adopt "a restric
tive rather than a literal or usual meaning of its words[.]"82

The court concluded that the language "[t]he trustee may recover
from property securing an allowed secured claim," plainly and
unambiguously limited standing to the trustee. 83 The court also ob
served that the statute's legislative history demonstrated clear in
tent to limit standing to the trustee or debtor-in-possession. 84 The
court believed that this indubitable expression of Congressional in
tent should end any further inquiry into the standing issue.
The court noted, however, that other courts had found the leg
islative history less convincing. 85 In response to those decisions, the
Great Northern Forest Products court continued by considering the
overall policy of the Bankruptcy Code as set forth in sections 726(b)
and 1123(a)(4).86 Both sections express the fundamental policy that
"all claimants whose claims are entitled to the same class of distri
bution shall be reimbursed pro-rata."87 Applying the equitable dis
tribution policy in section 726(b), the court reasoned that allowing
third party standing would elevate a "general administrative claim
ant to a superpriority administrative or a secured claimant. "88 Pre
sumably, such a result would unfairly advantage the claimant by
82. [d. at 64 (citations omitted).
83. [d. at 65. The court noted that "[t]here is no reference in the statute to 'af
fected entity', 'aggrieved person', or other parties." Id.
84. Id. at 65-66. Despite the Great Northern Forest Prods. court's assured reading
of the legislative history, other decisions have reached opposite results construing the
same section of the Congressional Record. See Fulcrum Int'l, Ltd. v. Saybrook Mfg.
Co., 124 B.R. 141, 144-45 (M.D. Ga. 1991). See also infra notes 134-46 and accompany
ing text which discuss the legislative history of § 506(c).
85. Great N. Forest Prods., 135 B.R. at 66.
86. Id. at n.26.
87. Id. at 66.
88. Id. at 67. The difficulty with this argument is two-fold. First, it assumes a
§ 506(c) claimant is in fact merely a ·general administrative claimant, rather than a
unique type of claimant recognized by a separate section of the Bankruptcy Code. In
deed, a general administrative claimant need confer no benefit upon the secured credi
tor to pursue a claim for expenses under § 503. By contrast, the § 506(c) claimant's
expenses are limited by "the extent of any benefit to the [secured creditor]." 11 U.S.C.
§ 506(c) (1988). Second, it assumes that the equitable result is somehow different when
the trustee, or debtor-in-possession, pursues the claim, as opposed to the third party.
Certainly, it is irrelevant to the estate or secured creditors if the trustee recovers for the
third party, or if the third party is compensated independently. It is immaterial which
party pursues the claim. See infra notes 160-66 and accompanying text which consider
the merits of the argument regarding equitable distribution.
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permitting her to step outside her statutory class of distribution,
while concomitantly reducing the pro-rata shares remaining for
other unsecured creditors. This result would be even more objec
tionable if the estate lacked funds to satisfy claims beyond the se
cured creditors. 89
Lastly, the court attacked the rationale underlying decisions
that granted third party standing by comparing the derivative stand
ing conferred upon creditors' committees to the direct standing
sought by third party section 506(c) claimants. 90 The court ob
served that creditors' committees possessed derivative standing to
recover claims for the estate if the trustee failed to commence litiga
tion. 91 However, creditors' committees could not recover for their
own benefit. 92 The court concluded that this position "recognize[d],
either explicitly or implicitly, that only the trustee has standing for
the estate."93
By contrast, the third party claimant under section 506(c)
sought independent standing to pursue a claim for its own benefit.
Thus, with respect to section 506(c), the court explained that third
party standing would confer quasi-trustee standing on third parties
to assert claims for their own benefit, rather than the benefit of the
estate. 94 Such an interpretation would permit any unpaid adminis
trative claimant to pursue a recovery under section 506(c) for costs
and expenses. 95 The court concluded that "[c]ases that allow an en
tity to be substituted for the trustee as a plaintiff should not be
interpreted to create independent direct standing for a creditor to
assert a cause of action for its sole individual benefit."96 In so hold
ing, the Great Northern Forest Products court rejected the land
lord's section 506(c) claim to charge the secured creditor's interest
for post-petition back rent and environmental clean up costS.97
Other decisions have limited section 506( c) standing on differ
ent grounds. 98 In particular, some courts have construed section
89.

Great N. Forest Prods., 135 B.R. at 67.
Id. at 67-69 (citing Equitable Gas Co. v. Equibank N.A. (In re McKeesport
Steel Castings Co.), 799 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1986».
90.

91.

[d.

[d. at 68.
[d.
94. [d. at 68-69.
95. [d. at 69. The court added that "[s]uch an interpretation of § 506(c) may
willy-nilly spawn satellite actions resulting in a litigation free for all." [d.
96. Id. at 68 (emphasis deleted).
97. [d. at 69.
98. It is interesting to note that courts construing § 506(c) frequently pursue dif
92.
93.
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506( C) as a limited exception to the general rule that requires an
estate to bear its own costs of administration. 99 In Ramaker, the
court reasoned that "[s]ection 506(c) is an exception which recog
nizes that the estate and the unsecured creditors should not be re
quired to bear the costs or expenses incurred by the estate to care
for a secured creditor's collateral. "100 The court focussed on an ad
ministrative claimant's position under Bankruptcy Code section
364.101 The court noted that, because section 364 governs un
secured creditors' post-petition remedies against the debtor, a post
petition claimant's "remedy lies under [section] 503(b)(1) and the
distribution provided under [section] 726."102 Alternatively, the un
secured post-petition creditors could seek a security interest under
section 364(c) to protect their interests, if they believed the debtor
to be a financially risky prospect. 103 In short, the unsecured post
petition creditor should protect itself under section 364, or resign
itself to the priority of an administrative claimant under section
503(b)(1). Stated differently, section 506( c) was not "intended to
create an independent cause of action in favor of those entities pro
viding goods or services on credit to an estate."l04
In summary, courts have denied standing to third parties on a
variety of grounds. In particular, courts have relied on the express
language of section 506(c), the statute's legislative history, the equi
table distribution policy of section 726(b), and the priority of ad
ministrative costs under section 503(b)(1) in holding that only the
trustee or debtor-in-possession may pursue a section 506( c) claim.
ferent lines of reasoning in reaching the same conclusion. For 'example, the Ramaker
court did not explore the policies of Bankruptcy Code § 726(b), or the role of derivative
standing in prior decisions, in reaching its conclusion. Likewise, the Great Northern
Forest Products court overlooked the Ramaker court's reasoning, which focussed on the
different grounds for allowing administrative expenses in relation to § 506(c).
99. See White Front Feed & Seed, Div. of Paul Lammers & Sons, Inc. v. State
Nat'l Bank (In re Ramaker), 117 B.R. 959 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1990).
100. Id. at 966.
101. Bankruptcy Code § 364 authorizes a trustee, or debtor-in-possession, to ob
tain unsecured credit in the ordinary course of business. Specifically, the Code provides
in relevant part:
(a) If the trustee is authorized to operate the business of the debtor under
section 721, 1108, 1304, 1203, or 1204 of this title, unless the court orders
otherwise. the trustee may obtain unsecured credit and incur unsecured debt
in the ordinary course of business allowable under section 503(b)(1) of this
title as an administrative expense.
11 U.S.c. § 364(a) (1988).
102. Ramaker, 117 B.R. at 967.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 966.
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Other courts, however, have disagreed on equally principled
grounds.
B.

Section 506(c) Standing Extended to Third Party
Administrative Claimants

In stark contrast to the Great Northern Forest Products court,
other courts have decided that section 506(c) standing does extend
to third party administrative claimants.1°5 Like the decisions deny
ing third party standing, the decisions permitting a third party to
pursue a section 506(c) claim have offered different reasons for ex
tending standing. 106 Some of the rationales adopted by courts
granting standing are irreconcilable with decisions confining stand
ing to the trustee. As the decisions discussed below will illustrate,
no judicial consensus exists regarding either the relationship be
tween section 506(c) and other Bankruptcy Code sections, or the
economic and legal consequences of allowing third party standing.
In Parque Forestal, the residents of a chapter 11 debtor's hous
ing development argued that section 506( c) required the secured
creditor to pay for a security patrol of the residential premises. 107
105. See PSI, Inc. v. Anguillard (In re Senior-G & A Operating Co.), 957 F.2d
1290 (5th Cir. 1992); In re Parque Forestal, Inc., 949 F.2d 504 (1st Cir. 1991); New
Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. First Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n (In re Delta Towers, Ltd.),
924 F.2d 74 (5th Cir. 1991); Equitable Gas Co. v. Equibank N.A. (In re McKeesport
Steel Castings Co.), 799 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1986); Shaw v. Travelers (In re Grant Assocs.),
154 B.R. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); United States, Internal Revenue Service v. Boatmens
First Nat'l Bank, 5 F.3d 1157 (8th Cir. 1993); In re Mechanical Maintenance, Inc., 128
B.R. 382 (E.D. Pa. 1991); Fulcrum Int'l, Ltd. v. Saybrook Mfg. Co., 124 B.R. 141 (M.D.
Ga. 1991); In re Blaisure, 150 B.R. 343 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1992); In re Evanston Beauty
Supply, Inc., 136 B.R. 171 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992); In re Scopetta-Senra Partnership III,
129 B.R. 700 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1991); Cavender v. Ameritrust Co. (In re Opti-Gage,
Inc.), 124 B.R. 515 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1991); In re So Good S. Potato Chip Co., 116 B.R.
144 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1990); Geller v. International Club Enters., Inc. (In re Int'l Club
Enters., Inc.), 105 B.R. 190 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1989); In re Chicago Lutheran Hosp. Ass'n,
89 B.R. 719 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988); In re Cann & Saul Steel Co., 86 B.R. 413 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1988); In re DLS Indus., Inc., 71 B.R. 679 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987); Guy v.
Grogan (In re Staunton Indus., Inc.), 74 B.R. 501 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1987); In re Bird
sboro Casting Corp., 69 B.R. 955 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987); In re World Wines, Ltd., 77
B.R. 653 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1987); In re Energy Coop., Inc., 55 B.R. 957 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1985); In re Reda, Inc., 54 B.R. 871 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1985); In re T.P. Long Chern. Inc.,
45 B.R. 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985); In re Loop Hosp. Partnership, 50 B.R. 565
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1985); National Bank of N. Am. v. Isaac Cohen Clothing Corp. (In re
Isaac Cohen Clothing Corp.), 39 B.R. 199 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984).
106. See, e.g., Parque Forestal, 949 F.2d at 512-13 (focussing on equitable out
come); Fulcrum Int'l, 124 B.R. at 144 (examining legislative intent behind § 506(c»;
Scopetta-Senra Partnership Ill, 129 B.R. at 702 (discussing application of Bankruptcy
Code § 726(b».
107. Parque Forestal, 949 F.2d at 507.
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Because both the secured creditor and the chapter 11 debtor had
refused to pay for the security services, several of the residents had
assumed the responsibility of paying the security company. lOB The
secured creditor argued that the residents lacked standing to pursue
a claim under section 506(c).109
Considering the residents' claim, the Parque Forestal court
noted that despite conflicting authority regarding the standing is
sue, the residents' claim evoked the precise equitable concerns that
persuaded several courts to extend standing to third party claim
ants. 110 Relying on Equitable Gas Co. v. Equibank, N.A. (In re Mc
Keesport Steel Castings Co.), 111 the court reasoned:
[t]he rule that individual creditors cannot act in lieu of the trustee
is often breached when sufficient reason exists to permit the
breach. In this case[,] neither the debtor in possession nor a
creditors['] committee had reason to make a claim on behalf of
... [the third party claimant] .... Thus, because ... [the third
party claimant] had a colorable claim for expenses and was the
only creditor that would zealously pursue that claim, it has stand
ing to bring a § S06(c) action. 112

Specifically, the court observed that the chapter 11 debtor lacked
any economic incentive to pursue a claim against the secured credi
tor: "The debtor in possession had no funds, and its debt to .... the
secured creditor, exceeded the value of the bankrupt estate ... "113
In short, the debtor-in-possession would accede to the benefit of
the security services without any expense to itself. Additionally, the
court found that the security services offered a significant benefit to
the secured creditor by protecting the mortgaged residential prop
erty from theft or vandalism.1 14 In the absence of any motivation
for either the debtor-in-possession or the secured creditor to pursue
the section 506(c) claim, the court found that the residents, as third
party claimants, would be entitled to bring the claim under section
108. Id. at 506.
109. Id. at 507.
110. Id. at 511 (citing New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. First Fed. Say. and Loan
Ass'n (In re Delta Towers, Ltd.), 924 F.2d 74 (5th Cir. 1991) and citing Equitable Gas
Co. v. Equibank N.A. (In re McKeesport Steel Castings Co.), 799 F.2d 91 (3d CiT.
1986».
111. 799 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1986).
112. Parque Forestal, 949 F.2d at 511-12 (quoting McKeesport Steel Castings, 799
F.2d at 94).
113. Id. at 512.
114. Id.
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506(c).115 The court confined its analysis, however, to this equitable
argument regarding the willingness -of the trustee or debtor-in-pos
session to pursue the section 506( c) claim.
Other decisions have' focussed on the policies underlying the
Bankruptcy Code in deciding to extend third party standing under
section 506(c). For example, in Scopetta-Senra Partnership III,116
the court addressed the equitable distribution concerns expressed in
Bankruptcy Code section 726(b). In Scopetta-Senra, administrative
claimants sought to charge rent costs against the secured creditors'
interests in the debtor's inventory.117 Initially, the court noted that
section 506(c) is an equitable remedy, exercised to prevent secured
creditors from receiving a windfall at the expense of the trustee or
administrative creditors. lls The court added that the Bankruptcy
Code could not have intended a result that would permit secured
creditors to acquire such a windfall.u 9
The court then addressed the policies of Bankruptcy Code sec
tion 726(b ).120 First, the court posited that "the windfall that the
secured creditors would receive clearly outweighs the distribution
objectives established by Congress in [s]ection 726(b) of the
Code."121 Moreover, because section 506(c) reduces only the
amount to be paid to the secured creditor, the Bankruptcy Code's
distributional objectives are not violated by extending third party
standing. 122 Lastly, the court reasoned that, regardless of whether
the trustee or the third party pursued the section 506(c) claim, the
effect on the secured creditor's interest would be the same: it
would be diminished by the amount of the claim. 123 Thus, because
section 726(b) distributional concerns would be implicated equally
by a trustee's pursuit of a section 506(c) claim, a third party should
not be denied standing. Following the implication of these argu
ments, the court permitted the administrative claimants to bring the
section 506(c) claim for unpaidrent. 124
Other courts have granted third party standing based on the
statutory language and legislative history of section 506( c). In Ful
115. Id.
116. In re Scopetta-Senra Partnership III, 129 B.R. 700 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1991).
117. Id. at 700-01.
118. Id. at 701.
119. Id.
120. [d. at 702.
121. [d.
122. Id.
123. [d.
124. [d.
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crum International, Ltd. v. Saybrook Manufacturing Co. ,125 a bro
ker filed a section 506( c) request for assessment of fees against the
proceeds of the secured creditor's interest in the collateral. The se
cured creditor objected to the request, arguing that the broker
lacked independent standing to pursue such a claim. 126 Agreeing
with the secured creditor, the bankruptcy court dismissed the claim
on the grounds that the broker lacked standing. 127
On appeal, the district court examined the statutory language
and legislative history of section 506(c).128 After reciting the lan
guage of section 506(c), the court recognized its obligation to en
force the statute according to its terms "where [...] the statute's
language [was] plain."129 The court added, however, that if the lit
eral application of the statute would produce an outcome:> at odds
with the drafter's intent, the court would be required to follow the
drafter's intent po The court believed section 506(c)'s legislative
history demonstrated that "the purpose of section 506( c) is to shift
the cost of preserving or disposing of a secured creditor's collateral
from the estate to the secured party."131 The court concluded,
therefore, that a third party claimant would have standing if she
demonstrated an entitlement to receive reimbursement for which
the trustee refused to file a claim. 132 In allowing third party stand
ing, the Fulcrum International court focussed on the cost-shifting
objectives of section 506( c), rather than the identity of the claimant
pursuing those costs. Apparently, the court believed that the cost
125. 124 B.R. 141 (M.D. Ga. 1991).
126. Id. at 143.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 144.
129. Id. (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989)
(omission in the original)). The ironies of statutory interpretation are particularly evi
dent when this decision is compared with the decision in Boyd v. Dock's Comer Assocs.
(In re Great N. Forest Prods., Inc.), 135 B.R. 46, 62-70 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1991). Both
cases cited identical rules of construction in reaching completely opposite results re
garding § 506(c) standing.
130. Fulcrum Int'l, 129 B.R. at 144.
131. Id. The legislative history of § 506(c) stated in part:
Any time the trustee or debtor in possession expends money to provide for the
reasonable and necessary cost and expenses of preserving or disposing of a
secured creditor's collateral, the trustee or debtor in possession is entitled to
recover such expenses from the secured party or from the property securing an
allowed secured claim held by such party.
Id. (citing 124 CONGo REc. 32,398 (1978) (statement of Representative Don Edwards),
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6436, 6451).
132. Id. at 145. The court's requirement that the trustee refuse to pursue the
third party claimant's § 506(c) claim will be discussed extensively infra notes 187-202
and accompanying text.
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shifting policies outweighed the consequences of permitting a third
party to bring the claim. Because the debtor-in-possession refused
to pursue any of the broker's section 506(c) claims, the court found
that the broker had independent standing to bring the claim.1 33
The foregoing decisions illustrate the numerous grounds that
courts have used in permitting third party claimants to pursue sec
tion 506( c) claims. Most of these decisions are irreconcilable with
the decisions of courts that limited standing to the trustee or
debtor-in-possession. This division of authority offers little prece
dential guidance for courts considering section 506( c) standing. In
an attempt to offer a principled resolution to this conflict, Part IV
of this Article further develops the reasoning suggested in these
opinions, and posits several additional factors that ought to be con
sidered in addressing section 506(c) standing. In doing so, this Arti
cle ultimately concludes that third party claimants should have
independent standing to pursue section 506( c) claims when the
trustee refuses to pursue a colorable claim.
IV.

POLICY AND LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS OF SECTION 506(c)
STANDING

This section of the Article considers the grounds for extending
section 506(c) standing to third party claimants, as well as the con
sequences of extending standing. In particular, this section ap
praises the usefulness of statutory construction methods applied by
courts considering section 506(c), the equitable powers of section
105, the equitable distribution policies of section 726(b), derivative
versus direct standing, and alternative remedies available to third
party claimants.
A.

Statutory Construction and Legislative History

The legislative history of section 506( c) provides dubious au
thority for allowing, or denying, third party claimants' standing.
Nevertheless, courts considering the problem of section 506(c)
standing have often initiated their analyses with a discussion of the
language and legislative history of section 506(c). Regardless of
their final conclusions, courts have employed a two-step method to
interpret the meaning of section 506(c).134 Following two sequen
133. Id.
134. Compare In re New England Carpet Co., 28 B.R. 766 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1983)
(the legislative history of § 506(c) illustrates an intent to limit standing to the trustee),
affd sub nom. Gravel, Shea & Wright, Ltd. v. New England Carpet Co. (In re New
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tial rules of construction articulated by the Supreme Court in
United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc.,135 courts inquire, ini
tially, whether the language of section 506(c) is "plain."136 If the
meaning is plainly evident, the court must enforce the statute "ac
cording to its terms."137 However, if the statute's literal application
leads to a result that conflicts with the intention of the drafters,
then the court must focus on the drafters' intent to produce a har
monious construction. 138 Of course, this entire analysis presumes
that the drafters' intent can be discerned. Unfortunately, legislative
intent is often as enigmatic as the statute itself: 139 section 506(c)
provides a good case in point.
The legislative history of section 506(c) offers little insight into
Congressional intent with respect to third party claimants. In fact,
the legislative history is confined to paraphrases of the statute it
self.l40 The Committee on the Judiciary's Report to the House of
Representatives offered only a brief reference to the origin of the
statute and a recapitulation of the language of section 506(c). The
report stated:
Subsection (c) also codifies current law by permitting the trustee
to recover from property whose value is greater than the sum of
the claims secured by a lien on that property that [sic] reason
able, necessary costs and expenses of preserving, or disposing of,
the property. The recovery is limited to the extent of any benefit
England Carpet Co.), 38 B.R. 703 (D.C. Vt.), affd sub nom. Gravel, Shea & Wright,
Ltd. v. Bank of New England (In re New England Carpet Co.), 744 F.2d 16 (2d Cir.
1984) with Fulcrum Int'l, Ltd. v. Saybrook Mfg. Co., 124 B.R. 141, 144-45 (Bankr. M.D.
Ga. 1991) (the legislative history of § 506(c) emphasizes the policy of shifting preserva
tion and disposition expenses).
135. 489 U.S. 235 (1989).
136. Id. at 241.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 242.
139. Indeed, as many commentators have suggested, legislative intent may be a
questionable basis upon which to ground any interpretation of specific statutory lan
guage. Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 405,428-34 (1989). Professor Sunstein notes that when construing the meaning of
a particular statute, "courts should approach legislative history cautiously." Id. at 43l.
For purposes of this discussion, though, it is sufficient to question the validity of those
decisions that assumed Congressional intent based upon the lack of specific language in
the legislative history surrounding Bankruptcy Code § 506(c).
140. See S. REP. No. 989, supra note 11, at 68, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5854; H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 11, at 357, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6313;
124 CONGo REc. 32,398 (1978) (statement of Representative Don Edwards), reprinted
in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6436, 6451; 124 CoNG. REC. 33,997 (1978) (statement of Senator
Dennis DeConcini), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6505, 6520.
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to the holder of such claim.141
As Part II of this Article illustrates, it would have been extremely
problematic merely to codify the "current law" into section
506(c).142 Indeed, if section 506(c) embodied such a legislative in
tent, Congress would have failed to clarify the morass of conflicting
caselaw that existed under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. More sig
nificantly, however, this language makes no reference to the propri
ety of expense claims from parties other than the trustee or debtor
in-possession. But because the legislative history is little more than
a paraphrase of the statute, we cannot conclude that the absence of
specific references to third party claimants precludes a finding that
third parties could possess standing.
The statements proffered by members of Congress during dis
cussion of the House Report add little to the House Report itself.
Senator Dennis DeConcini and Representatiye Don Edwards each
limited their respective references to section 506(c) to identical
statements. Both Congressmen stated:
Section 506(c) of the House amendment was contained in H.R.
8200 as passed by the House and adopted, verbatim, in the Sen
ate amendment. Any time the trustee or debtor in possession ex
pends money to provide for the reasonable and necessary cost
and expenses of preserving or disposing of a secured creditor's
collateral, the trustee or debtor in possession is entitled to re
cover such expenses from the secured party or from the property
securing an allowed secured claim held by such party.1 43
Apart from restating the language of section 506(c), this legislative
history adds little except the term "debtor in possession." This is
not particularly helpful in ascertaining the scope of section 506(c)
standing. 144 At best, the additional language affirms Bankruptcy
Code section l107(a),145 which vests virtually the same rights and
powers of a trustee in the debtor-in-possession. In fact, a debtor
141. See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 11, at 357, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 6313.
142. See supra notes 13-67 and accompanying text which discuss the confusion
under prior case law.
143. 124 CONGo REC. 32,398 (1978) (emphasis added) (statement of Representa
tive Don Edwards), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6436, 6451; 124 CONGo REC. 33,997
(1978) (emphasis added) (statement of Senator Dennis DeConcini), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6505, 6520.
144. Many courts, however, have seized upon the inclusion of this term to support
the conclusion that Congress intended to limit the use of § 506(c) to trustees and debt
ors-in-possession. See supra note 84.
145. 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (1988).
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in-possession would have possessed section 506(c) standing, regard
less of the legislative history, based solely upon section 1l07(a).
Thus, this legislative recognition of a separate Code section's effect
on section 506(c) is not particularly probative of any deliberate in
tent to preclude third party claimants from filing claims under sec
tion 506(c). Nevertheless,numerous courts have relied on this
amorphous legislative history to deny standing to third party
claimants.146

B. Bankruptcy Code Section 105 Equitable Powers
Bankruptcy Code section 105147 empowers bankruptcy courts
to exercise broad equitable powers to facilitate the goals and pur
poses of the Bankruptcy Code. 148 Courts have followed two differ
ent schools of thought when exercising these equitable powers. 149
The first approach constrains the reach of section 105 to very spe
cific and narrow applications. The second approach, by contrast,
perceives section 105 as a tool that permits bankruptcy courts to
"fill the gaps left by the [Bankruptcy Code's] statutory lan
guage."150 It is clear, however, that section 105 cannot be used in
146. See Central States, S.E. and S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Robbins (In re
Interstate Motor Freight Sys., IMFS, Inc.), 71 B.R. 741, 742-43 (Bankr. W.D. Mich.
1987) ("Interstate I"); In re Dakota Lay'd Eggs, 68 BR 975, 977 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1987);
In re Air Ctr., Inc., 48 B.R. 693, 694 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1985); In re New England
Carpet Co., 28 B.R. 766, 771-72 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1983), affd sub nom. Gravel, Shea &
Wright, Ltd. v. New England Carpet Co. (In re New England Carpet Co.), 38 B.R. 703
(D.C. Vt.), affd sub nom. Gravel, Shea & Wright, Ltd. v. Bank of New England (In re
New England Carpet Co.), 744 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1984).
147. The statutory language that codifies the bankruptcy court's equitable powers
provides:
The court may issue any order, process, or judginent that is necessary or ap
propriate to carry out the provisions of this title. No provision of this title
providing for the raising of an issue by a party in interest shall be construed to
preclude the court from, sua sponte, taking any action or making any determi
nation necessary or appropriate to enforce or implement court orders or rules,
or to prevent an abuse of process.
11 U.S.c. § 105 (a) (1988).
148. See In re Middleton Arms, Ltd. Partnership, 934 F.2d 723 (6th Cir. 1991).
Bankruptcy Code § 105 derives from § 2a(15) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. See 11
U.S.c. § 11(a)(15) (1976) (repealed 1978). The earlier law was viewed as an express
grant of equitable power to issue orders necessary to the administration of the debtor's
estate. See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY'll 105.01[2] (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed.
1992). At least one commentator has suggested that § 105 confers a broader set of
powers upon the bankruptcy court than its predecessor. Id.
149. See 2 COLLIER, Supra note 148, 'lI 105.01[3]. See generally Manuel D. Leal,
Power of the Bankruptcy Court: Section 105, 29 S. TEX. L. REv. 487 (1988) (discussing
different methods of applying § 105).
150. 2 COLLIER, supra note 148, 'lI 105.01[3].
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contravention of the Code's express statutory language, regardless
of the apparent "equities" before a court,151 One commentator has
even suggested that the statutory language "suggests that an exer
cise of section 105 power be tied to another Bankruptcy Code sec
tion and not merely to a general bankruptcy concept or
objective."152 However, in a less polemic recognition of section 105
power, the Supreme Court stated that "whatever equitable powers
remain in the bankruptcy courts must and can only be exercised
within the confines of the Bankruptcy Code."153
With respect to section 506(c), section 105 offers a foundation
within the Bankruptcy Code upon which to extend standing to third
party claimants. Obviously, the language of section 105 confers no
such express authority. Moreover, to comport with the Supreme
Court's admonition, section 105 should be limited to remedying am
biguities, or contradictory results, that occur within the Code it
self.154 Such a construction lends considerable support to extending
standing to third party claimants under section 506(c).
Yet, despite this equitable power, section 105 has been rejected
as a ground upon which to extend standing to third parties under
section 506(c).155 In Central States, S.E. and S. W. Pension Fund v.
Robbins (In re Interstate Motor Freight Sys., IMFS, Inc.), the admin
istrative claimants argued that section 105 permitted the court to
grant them independent standing to pursue their section 506(c)
claim.156 The court refused to exercise its equitable powers on the
grounds that independent standing would violate express provisions
151. See Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988).
152. Id. In a sense, however, this observation begs the question. It would be
difficult, if not impossible, to interpret any of the Bankruptcy Code without some refer
ence to the objectives of the bankruptcy process. Certainly, in clear cases, a court
should not use § 105 powers to obviate the Bankruptcy Code's express language, or
invent a "bankruptcy common law." In practice, however, a court is unlikely to need
§ 105 powers when the applicable law is readily ascertainable. Rather, a court will re
quire such power when the question before it eludes the Code's express provisions, or
when it appears to conflict with the Code's policies as expressed in other Code sections.
153. See Norwest Bank Worthington, 485 U.S. at 206.
154. Such a construction of § 105 avoids the pitfall of creating an omnipotent eq
uitable power that could be used in derogation of the express provisions of the Code.
Section 105 should not be construed to reduce the Bankruptcy Code to a set of rules so
flexible that they may be followed or ignored whenever a judge decides the circum
stances warrant a certain result. Some degree of consistency and predictability is re
quired within the Bankruptcy Code.
155. See Central States, S.E. and S.W. Pension Fund v. Robbins (In re Interstate
Motor Freight Sys., IMFS, Inc.), 86 B.R. 500 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1988) ("Interstate
II").
156. Id. at 501.
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of the Code.1 57 Specifically, the court found that "a grant of stand
ing to these [claimants] would favor them over any other adminis
trative claimant or unsecured creditors."158 In short, the court
concluded that express provisions of the Bankruptcy Code pre
vented it from exercising its equitable powers under section 105.
As the forthcoming discussion will illustrate, however, the
Bankruptcy Code does not, either impliedly or expressly, prohibit
independent third party standing under section 506(c).1 59 In fact,
numerous bankruptcy policies support extending section 506(c)
standing to third parties. Section 105, therefore, should be viewed
as a mechanism that enables courts to avoid inequitable applica
tions of section 506(c). Upon recognizing that the Bankruptcy
Code contains no proscription against third party standing, section
105 may be construed in light of other equitable considerations re
quiring third party standing in some circumstances. This limited ap
plication avoids the danger of allowing section 105 to become an
equitable "catch-all" to be employed by any party dissatisfied with
the results of a particular decision.
C.

Bankruptcy Code Section 726(b) and Equitable Distribution

Some courts have concluded that third party standing must be
limited to the trustee on the grounds that the Bankruptcy Code's
equitable distribution policy requires such a conclusion. 160 In par
ticular, courts have suggested that section 726(b ),161 which requires
157. Id. at 503.
158. Id. The court followed the reasoning in its prior opinion in Central States,
S.E. and S.W. Pension Fund v. Robbins. (In re Interstate Motor Freight Sys., IMFS,
Inc.), 71 B.R. 741 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987) ("Interstate In). In Interstate I, the court
reasoned that the equitable distribution rule expressed in Bankruptcy Code § 726(b)
precluded third party standing under § 506(c). As the forthcoming discussion demon
strates, though, the court's reasoning in Interstate I failed to discern several important
characteristics of a § 506(c) claim that preclude the application of § 726(b). See infra
notes 160-66 and accompanying text.
159. See infra notes 160-87 and accompanying text which discuss the relationship
of § 506(c) with other Code provisions.
160. See Boyd v. Dock's Comer Assocs. (In re Great N. Forest Prods., Inc.), 135
B.R. 46, 66-67 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1991); Interstate I, 71 B.R. at 744-45.
161. Section 726(b) of the Bankruptcy Code provides the following:
Payment on claims of a kind specified in paragraph (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6) or
(7) of section 507(a) of this title, or in paragraph (2), (3), (4), or (5) of subsec
tion (a) of this section, shall be made pro rata among claims of the kind speci
fied in each such particular paragraph, except that in a case that has been
converted to this chapter under section 1112[,]1208, or 1307 of this title, ...
[administrative expenses] incurred under this chapter after such conversion
has priority over ... [administrative expenses] incurred under any other chap
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equitable distribution among similarly situated classes of claimants,
precludes third party administrative claimants from filing section
506(c) claims. 162 Essentially, this view contends that third parties
could use section 506(c) to step outside section 726(b)'s statutory
distribution scheme and gain a priority position under section
503(b).
Such an interpretation of sections 726(b) and 506( c) reveals
several misconceptions regarding the nature of a section 506( c)
claim. First, and perhaps most importantly, it is essential to recog
nize that section 506(c) establishes a unique type of administrative
claim within the Bankruptcy Code. When drafting the Bankruptcy
Code, Congress created a particular category of claims which it de
scribed as "administrative expenses" in section 503. Separately, in
section 506, Congress addressed the rights and liabilities of the
holder of an allowed secured claim. Within that section, Congress
recognized the obligation of a secured claimholder to compensate
an administrative claimant for services directly related to the collat
eral and benefitting the secured creditor. This obligation is funda
mentally distinct from the obligation of an estate to satisfy its own
administrative costs as required by section 503.
Clearly, the section 506(c) claim shares some of the character
istics of an administrative claim under section 503. Both claims in
volve post-petition costs and expenses that are incurred by third
parties in service to the reorganization or liquidation proceedings.
However, unlike section 503, the section 506(c) claimant's costs and
expenses must relate to the secured creditor's collateral and must
benefit the secured creditor .163 In fact, the section 506( c) claimant
ter of this title or under this chapter before such conversion and over any
expenses of a custodian superseded under section 543 of this title.
11 U.S.C. § 726(b) (1988) (footnote omitted). The same equitable goal is incorporated
in 11 u.s.c. § 1123(a)(4) (1988).
162. See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text which explain the Great North
ern Forest Products court's reasoning in denying third party standing based upon
§ 726(b).
163. Alternatively, some courts have allowed the secured creditor to be charged
with § 506(c) costs if the secured creditor consented to those expenditures. See United
States v. Arnett Ford, Inc. (In re Arnett Ford, Inc.), 64 B.R. 946 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1986);
Crownover v. Manufacturers Hanover Commercial Corp. (In re Central Foundry Co.),
45 B.R. 395 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1984). With respect to the "benefit" language in
§ 506(c), the judicially created doctrine of consent appears premised on the assumption
that a secured creditor would be unlikely to consent to expenditures that provided no
benefit to the secured creditor. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this discussion, even
the requirement to prove "consent" would distinguish a § 506(c) claim from a typical
§ 503(b) administrative claimant.
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cannot recover any expenses if the secured creditor is not benefit
ted by the expenditures. By contrast, the section 503(b) claimant is
not required to establish that any benefit accrued to the secured
creditor. Additionally, a section 503(b) claim need not be related
to the preservation or disposition of the secured creditor's collat
eral. In short, the section 506( c) claim is a fundamentally different
animal than the section 503(b) administrative claim: a section
506(c) claim is not "merely" an administrative claim.
It follows, therefore, that unlike section 503 administrative
claims, the Bankruptcy Code does not prioritize section 506( c)
claims in the hierarchy of distribution under section 507. 164 Section
506(c) does not create a distinct "class" of claimants who share in
the distribution of the estate's unencumbered assets. Instead, the
Code requires the section 506(c) claimant to look to the secured
claimholder for compensation. Therefore, it is erroneous to impose
the equitable distribution requirements of section 726(b) on a sec
tion 506(c) claimant who does not participate in the section 507 dis
tribution process. Those courts that have applied section 726(b) to
section 506( c) claims fail to apprehend this fundamental distinction.
Second, the application of section 726(b) to section 506( c)
standing draws a false distinction between the role of the trustee
and the third party in pursuing that claim. Specifically, it assumes
that the equitable outcome is somehow different when the trustee,
or debtor-in-possession, pursues the claim, as opposed to the third
party. It is clear, however, that the secured creditor's interest
would be identically diminished regardless of whether the trustee or
the third party filed the section 506(c) claim: the secured creditor
will be required to compensate either party. Moreover, it is irrele
vant to the estate whether the trustee recovers for the third party or
the third party is directly compensated. A section 506( c) recovery
is paid directly to the third party, rather than the general estate. Of
course, the estate is certainly benefitted because it is not required to
satisfy the obligation out of its own unencumbered assets. This
benefit, however, will accrue regardless of whether the trustee or
the third party brings the section 506( c) claim. Thus, the distinction
between the third party and trustee simply does not affect the equi
table distribution of the estate under section 726(b).
Lastly, it has been suggested that the windfall a secured
claimholder would receive if the trustee refused to pursue the sec
tion 506(c) claim outweighs any distributional objection under sec
164.

11 U.S.C. § 507 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).

30

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16:1

tion 726(b).165 Undoubtedly, the secured claimholder is benefitted
when a third party incurs expenses maintaining the secured credi
tor's collateral. In a sense, the third party is actually expending re
sources to protect the secured claimholder's interest. If a trustee,
or debtor-in-possession, refused to pursue a reasonable claim for
expenses, the secured creditor would receive a windfall at the ex
pense of the third party who agreed to perform the services with the
expectation of future payment. This inequitable result is avoided
by permitting the third party to protect itself by filing a section
506(c) claim. 166
D.

Direct or Derivative Standing

Some recent decisions have drawn an analogy between the
standing accorded creditors' committees to represent the trustee
and standing for third party claimants under section 506(c).167 This
analogy has been challenged by other decisions which have rejected
section 506(c) standing for third parties. Most notably, the Great
Northern Forest Products 168 court maintained that it would be erro
neous to extend direct standing to section 506(c) claimants based
upon prior decisions that allowed creditors' committees derivative
standing to pursue claims for the estate. 169 In particular, the court
reasoned that the courts that had granted creditors' committees
standing did so on the grounds that the creditors' committee would
pursue the claim for the benefit of the estate. 170 Thus, the creditors'
committee acted derivatively for the trustee. As the Great North
ern Forest Products court noted, "[t]his analysis ... recognizes,
either explicitly or implicitly, that only the trustee has standing for
the estate."l71 By contrast, the third party section 506(c) claimant
165. See supra notes 116-19 and accompanying text which discuss the Scopetta
Senra Partnership III court's resolution of the § 726(b) issues.
166. The limits of the third party's standing are suggested infra notes 187-201 and
accompanying text.
167. See In re Parque Forestal, Inc., 949 F.2d 504 (1st Cir. 1991); New Orleans
Pub. Serv., Inc. v. First Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n (In re Delta Towers, Ltd.), 924 F.2d 74
(5th Cir. 1991); Equitable Gas Co. v. Equibank N.A. (In re McKeesport Steel Castings
Co.), 799 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1986); In re Scopetta-Senra Partnership III, 129 B.R. 700
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1991).
168. Boyd v. Dock's Comer Assocs. (In re Great N. Forest Prods., Inc.), 135 B.R.
46 (Bankr. W.O. Mich. 1991).
169. Id. at 68-69..
170. Id. at 67-68 (citing Coral Petroleum, Inc. v. Banque Paribas-London, 797
F.2d 1351, 1362-63 (5th Cir. 1986».
171. Id. at 68.
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pursued the claim directly for its own benefit.l72
Although the above observation is accurate, for several rea
sons it is questionable whether it provides any basis upon which to
preclude third party standing under section 506(c). Most signifi
cantly, those decisions that have permitted a creditors' committee
to pursue a claim for the trustee addressed claims which, if recov
ered, would have entered the estate for equitable distribution.
Conversely, a section 506(c) claim does not enter the estate for dis
tributional purposes. For example, in Philadelphia Light Supply,173
a creditors' committee sought to pursue a claim to recover a prefer
ential transfer from an insider of the debtor-in-possession. 174
Under normal circumstances, the trustee, or debtor-in-possession,
would recover a preferential transfer for the benefit of the estate to
be distributed equitably under section 507. In this case, however,
the debtor-in-possession, despite its fiduciary obligations to the es
tate, lacked incentive to pursue a claim against the inside party.175
The court, citing a litany of authority, held that it could "authorize
the creditors' committee to institute suit under a colorable claim on
behalf of the debtor-in-possession or the trustee if these entities fail
to do SO."176 The court, therefore, granted the creditors' committee
standing to bring the preferential transfer claim for the estate.177
In contrast to a recovery of a preferential transfer for the es
tate, the section 506( c) claim is recovered for the benefit of the
claimant; the estate does not share in the recovery from the secured
creditor. Nevertheless, one commentator has suggested that "[a]
section 506(c) recovery is for the benefit of the estate."178 This as
sertion, however, is unsupported by case law. In fact, it is an incor
rect interpretation of the decision from which it originated. The
Dinsmore Tire Center case involved a trustee's claim for compensa
tion.179 The trustee argued that, beyond the compensation author
ized by the Bankruptcy Code, he was entitled to an additional
172. Id. at 69.
173. In re Philadelphia Light Supply Co., 39 B.R. 51 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984).
174. Id. at 51.
175. Id. The court observed the following: "The debtor in possession has not
commenced suit against [the insider] and we doubt that it would commence and zeal
ously prosecute such an action since [the insider] is the president and sole shareholder
of the debtor in possession." Id. at 52-53.
176. Id. at 52 & n.2 (footnote omitted).
177. Id. at 53.
178. 3 COLLIER, supra note 4, 'l[506.06, at 506-56 (citing In re Dinsmore Tire Ctr.,
Inc., 81 B.R. 136 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987)).
179. See Dinsmore Tire Ctr., 81 B.R. at 137.
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amount from the secured creditor for negotiating the sale and dis
bursing the proceeds of the creditor's collateral. 180 The court rea
soned, however, that the trustee's compensation was governed
exclusively by section 362(a) of the Code. 181 The Code provided no
authorization for the trustee to retain any payment beyond that al
lowed under section 362(a).182 Thus, any additional recovery by the
trustee for his services constituted "a recovery by the trustee for the
estate."183 The Dinsmore Tire Center court made no reference to
section 506(c) in connection with a recovery for the estate.
Thus, unlike the preferential transfer described in Philadelphia
Light Supply, the section 506(c) claim is not recovered for the bene
fit of the estate. Regardless of whether the trustee or a third party
pursues the claim, the section 506( c) claim is a recovery for the indi
vidual claimant. It is, therefore, meaningless to limit section 506(c)
standing on the principle that "only the trustee has standing for the
estate."184 In application, the trustee is required to pursue the
claim for the section 506(c) claimant. 18s Assertions to the contrary
notwithstanding,186 third party standing does not permit the third
party to usurp the trustee's role as the estate's fiduciary by prefer
entially recovering property of the estate. Rather, third party
standing allows the claimant to perform a distinct trustee function
related, not to the estate, but rather to the section 506( c) claim
against the secured claimholder. Consequently, the much bela
bored distinction between direct and derivative standing is superflu
ous in the context of third party standing under section 506( c).
In summary, neither the express provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code nor the Code's underlying policies preclude third party stand
ing for section 506(c) claims. It is, therefore, appropriate for courts
to exercise section 105 equitable powers to prevent the secured
claimholder from receiving a windfall at the expense of a party ren
dering post-petition services. Courts should, however, carefully for
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 138.
183. Id.
184. Boyd v. Dock's Corner Assocs. (In re Great N. Forest Prods., Inc.), 135 B.R.
46, 68 (Bankr. N.D. Mich. 1991).
185. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(c) (1988). Arguably, if § 506(c) did not exist, the trustee
could not pursue any claim for an administrative claimant without running afoul of his
or her fiduciary obligation to recover property for the estate under § 704(1). In other
words, § 506(c) establishes a limited role for the trustee in assessing statutorily defined
post-petition costs against a secured claimholder. This role exists independently of the
trustee's fiduciary obligations to the estate.
186. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
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mulate a rule governing independent standing for third party
claimants under section 506( c). The remainder of this Article is de
voted to suggesting a workable rule.

v.

Two

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

Any proposal to resolve the conflict regarding section 506( c)
claimants' standing must account for a myriad of difficulties. On
the one hand, as the discussion above indicates, the bright-line rule
denying standing to third party claimants produces inequitable and
unfair results for parties who render useful services to the secured
creditor's collateral (and, by implication, the debtor). On the other
hand, it is equally undesirable to permit any party that involves it
self with the post-petition debtor to submit a section 506(c) claim,
thereby complicating the administration or reorganization of the
debtor's estate. The following proposals attempt to reconcile the
competing interests in extending standing to third parties under sec
tion 506(c).
A.

The Demand-Futile Rule

Perhaps the most objectionable aspect of extending third party
standing concerns the circumvention of the trustee, or debtor-in
possession, by the third party claimant who renders services to the
estate and subsequently commences an action to recover the ex
pense of providing those services. This procedure bypasses the
trustee and complicates the process of managing the debtor's estate.
Granting third party claimants standing should not result in this
type of unnecessary satellite litigation that ultimately consumes the
estate's resources. lS7 Therefore, any rule permitting third party
standing should involve the trustee, or debtor-in-possession, to the
greatest extent possible.
Courts could adopt an equitable rule, without altering the ex
isting language of section 506(c), by creating a "demand-futile" pro
cedure for commencing a section 506( c) action. ISS To some extent,
such a procedure has already been recognized by several recent de
187. See, e.g., Great N. Forest Prods., 135 B.R. at 69 (suggesting that, if third party
standing were allowed, "every unpaid administrative claimant could sue a secured cred
itor under § 506(c) to seek to recover asserted costs or expenses"). See supra note 95
which expresses similar concerns.
188. As the prior discussion indicates, bankruptcy courts possess the authority to
create such a rule through 11 V.S.c. § 105(a) (1988). See supra notes 147-59 and ac
companying text.
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cisions. 189 Specifically, before a third party files a claim under sec
tion 506( c), the third party must formally submit the claim to the
trustee and request that the trustee pursue the claim for the third
party. If the trustee refuses to do so, the third party may commence
an action in its own name to recover reasonable and necessary sec
tion 506(c) expenses. If the third party fails to comply with this
procedure before submitting a section 506(c) claim, the court would
be required to dismiss the claim as procedurally unripe.
Such a demand-futile rule avoids the undesirable consequence
of permitting any third party to file an action in its own name
against the secured creditor. In many cases, the trustee may con
sider the third party's claim to be reasonable and willingly pursue
the claim for the third party. The demand-futile rule would reduce
the number of potential litigants involved in the bankruptcy pro
ceedings and consolidate the administration of the estate under the
trustee when it is feasible to do so. In the same respect, however,
this rule prevents a trustee who is hostile to the third party's inter
ests from unfairly blocking the claim. As one court noted, third
parties should be granted standing because "[a]ny other approach
would give the trustee unrestricted discretion as to whether a party
who arguably benefitted a secured creditor is entitled to pursue a
claim against the secured creditor."19o Further, the court explained
that
[i]f the trustee is friendly to the claimant, and is willing to pursue
the 11 U.S.c. § 506(c) claim on behalf of the claimant, the claim
ant will be able to collect assuming the 11 U.S.c. § 506(c) claim is
meritorious. If the trustee alone has standing, and the trustee is
hostile to the claimant, the claimant's claims will be denied with
out notice and an opportunity for a hearing. Such a result would
raise serious due process questions. 191

A trustee's, or debtor-in-possession's, unwillingness to pursue
a claim is particularly likely to arise in cases where the trustee lacks
a financial incentive to pursue the claim for the third party.192 For
189. See In re So Good S. Potato Chip Co., 116 B.R. 144, 146 (Bankr. E.D. Mo.
1990); Guy v. Grogan (In re Staunton Indus., Inc.), 74 B.R. 501, 506 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
1987); In re DLS Indus., Inc., 71 B.R. 679, 681 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987). Unfortunately,
these decisions have not received significant attention from other courts considering
this issue.
190. In re Chicago Lutheran Hosp. Ass'n, 89 B.R. 719, 726 n.9 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1988).
191. Id.
192. See Equitable Gas Co. v. Equibank N.A. (In re McKeesport Steel Castings
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example, in McKeesport Steel Castings CO., Equitable Gas Com
pany ("Equitable") supplied natural gas required to operate the
debtor's business prior to the filing of the debtor's chapter 11 peti
tion. 193 Equibank, N.A. ("Equibank"), the debtor-in-possession's
largest secured creditor, possessed a secured interest in the debtor's
inventory and accounts receivable.1 94 Though Equitable sought to
terminate service for the post-petition debtor-in-possession, the
bankruptcy court denied it permission to do so and required Equi
table to continue supplying natural gas. 195 The debtor-in-posses
sion failed to pay for any of the post-petition natural gas service. 196
Eventually, the debtor-in-possession was purchased as a going con
cern for $500,000.00. 197 Equitable sought to recover $57,261.16 for
post-petition natural gas service. 198
In allowing Equitable to bring a claim under section 506(c), the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit noted that
Equitable had provided gas service as required by the bankruptcy
court's order.1 99 Further, "neither the debtor in possession nor a
creditors committee had reason to make a claim on behalf of Equi
table, when the debtor would thereby be required to pay for utili
ties it had received without charge following the date that its
petition was filed."2°O In other words, by supplying the debtor-in
possession with natural gas, Equitable had preserved the going con
cern value of the debtor's business. Because the value was pre
served, the debtor's business sold at a higher price. Equibank, as a
secured creditor, directly benefitted from the preservation of the
debtor's going concern business value, yet it was not required to
pay for the benefit. 201 Of particular importance to the court, the
Co.), 799 F.2d 91, 94 (3d Cir. 1986); National Bank v. Isaac Cohen Clothing Corp. (In re
Isaac Cohen Clothing Corp.), 39 B.R. 199, 200 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984).
193. McKeesport Steel Castings, 799 F.2d at 92.
194. Id. at n.1.
195. Id. at 92.
196. [d.
197. Id. at 92-93.
198. Id. at 93.
199. Id. at 94.
200. Id.
201. In fact, the debtor-in-possession never paid Equitable for any post-petition
natural gas service. [d. at 92-93. Thus, considering the debtor-in-possession's financial
woes, Equitable's services may have ensured that the debtor had a going concern value
rather than merely a liquidation value. The court left little doubt that it believed that
Equibank benefitted from Equitable'S continued natural gas service. [d. at 94. The
court noted: "If gas service had been terminated, Equibank's ... recovery would have
been significantly less since these assets either would not have existed or would have
been worth little, if anything." Id.
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debtor-in-possession lacked incentive to pursue a section 506(c)
claim against Equibank because it had already received the natural
gas, and future gas service was not contingent upon payment to
Equitable.
It is clear that if the McKeesport Steel Castings court had de
nied Equitable standing to pursue a section 506(c) claim, Equibank
would have received an enormous windfall at Equitable's expense.
The court extended third party standing to prevent an unfair wind
fall to the secured creditor. Moreover, as a matter of bankruptcy
policy, the court's decision rests on firm ground. If only the debtor
in-possession possessed section 506(c) standing, other professionals,
trade creditors, and service industries would be likely to withdraw
from doing business with debtors-in-possession and trustees be
cause payment for their post-petition services would be subject to
the whim of the debtor-in-possession or trustee. In congruence
with the McKeesport Steel Castings decision, the demand-futile rule
suggested by this Article avoids such undesirable consequences by
allowing the third party to protect its interests through specific pro
cedural steps. Simultaneously, it provides a workable rule that en
sures consolidated management of the reorganization or liquidation
process while preventing secured creditors from profiting at the ex
pense of parties rendering services to the post-petition debtor. 202
B.

Amendment to Section 506(c)

Undoubtedly, the judiciary invests considerable time and effort
formulating case law rules to address gaps left by Congress in its
efforts to create statutory law. The issues surrounding third party
standing under section 506(c) exemplify this type of difficulty. Nev
ertheless, an amendment to section 506(c) would provide the sim
plest and clearest resolution to the conflicting interpretations of
third party standing. Such an amendment could easily codify the
202. Several commentators have also concluded that standing should be extended
to third party claimants under section 506(c). See 3 COLLIER, supra note 4, <j[ 506.06.
Specifically, one authority noted that
[t]he better view is that a secured creditor who received a direct benefit from
the rendition of services or provision of goods by' an administrative claimant of
the estate should have the collateral charged for such benefit, regardless of
whether the proceeds of such charge are paid to the debtor, debtor in posses
sion or trustee as reimbursement for its prior payment to the claimant or are
paid to the claimant directly.
Id. at n.7a. Another commentator observed that "cases that permit only the trustee to
seek 506(c) expenses from secured creditors ... seem ill-advised." See Carlson, supra
note 61, at 430-31.
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procedure suggested in the demand-futile rule outlined above. Cur
rently, section 506(c) provides that "[t]he trustee may recover from
property securing an allowed secured claim the reasonable, neces
sary costs and expenses of preserving or disposing of, such property
to the extent of any benefit of the holder of such claim."203 The
current language could be amended by adding the following sen
tence: Any other party may recover to the extent the trustee could
recover under this section if the party formally requests that the
trustee pursue a colorable claim under this section and the trustee
refuses to bring such a claim for that party.
This proposed amendment deserves some explanation. First,
the amendment limits any recovery by a third party "to the extent
the trustee could recover." This language prevents future confusion
regarding the amount recoverable by the third party. Namely, the
court should treat issues of "reasonable, necessary costs" and "ben
efit" to the secured claimholder in the same fashion for trustees and
third parties alike. Second, the amendment requires that the third
party "formally" request that the trustee pursue the claim. At mini
mum, this rule would require the third party to file a written re
quest with the trustee to bring a section 506( c) claim for the benefit
of the third party. Alternatively, in a more formal procedure, the
amendment might require the third party to file a Motion to Re
quest Trustee to Pursue a Section 506( c) Claim with the bankruptcy
court.204 Regardless, the amendment contemplates a definitive pro
cedure whereby the trustee is given adequate opportunity to pursue
the third party's claim if he or she desires to do so.
Finally, the proposed amendment utilizes the term "colorable
claim" to provide a trustee some basis upon which to reject the
third party's claim. The language seeks to prohibit third parties
from wasting judicial resources by bringing frivolous claims. The
trustee would have the opportunity to reject the claim and, if neces
sary, file a motion before the bankruptcy court seeking to deny the
third party standing on the grounds that the claim is meritless. On
the other hand, as the language suggests, the term "colorable claim"
should be construed broadly to include those claims involving the
disposition or preservation of the collateral that arguably conferred
a benefit upon the secured creditor. A narrow construction would

203. 11 u.s.c. § 506(c) (1988).
204. This would require an additional amendment to the Federal Rule of Bank
ruptcy Procedure regarding the filing of the motion.
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defeat the purpose of allowing a third party to pursue meritorious
claims.
Ultimately, the statutory solution follows a path similar to the
demand-futile case law rule. Both proposals attempt to provide
some basis to permit third parties to pursue section 506(c) claims
while simultaneously limiting the circumstances under which a third
party would be entitled to do so. Most importantly, however, either
solution would remedy the current conflict among the circuits and
provide a principled basis upon which to prevent secured creditors
from receiving a windfall at the expense of parties rendering serv
ices to the post-petition debtor.
CONCLUSION

The current version of Bankruptcy Code section 506(c) is de
rived from the equitable principle that persons protecting or man
aging a trust or res are entitled to recover their expenses from the
trust fund. 205 The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 attempted to codify this
idea, but it failed to provide a coherent method of determining the
types of costs and expenses chargeable to the secured creditor's in
terest. Moreover, though it was never specifically addressed, courts
appeared to allow standing to third party claimants under the Bank
ruptcy Act. 206 After nearly a century of confusing and frequently
conflicting decisional law, the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 added sec
tion 506(c). At first blush, section 506(c) appeared to limit standing
to pursue such a claim to trustees and debtors-in-possession.
Such a limited reading, however, produced inequitable results,
prompting a majority of courts to expand section 506(c) standing to
include third parties. 207 Other decisions, however, interpreted the
statutory language in a "literal" manner and limited section 506( c)
standing to the trustee or debtor-in-possession. 2 0 8 This Article con
fronts the arguments of those decisions that denied third parties
standing and concludes that no provision or policy of the Bank
ruptcy Code precludes granting standing to third parties. 209 In an
attempt to provide a workable alternative, this Article suggests that
bankruptcy courts, applying their equitable powers, could create a
demand-futile rule requiring third parties to request that the trustee
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
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See
See
See

supra
supra
supra
supra
supra

notes 12-16 and accompanying text.
notes 56-66 and accompanying text.
note 105.
note 67.
notes 134-86 and accompanying text.
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pursue their section 506(c) claim prior to bringing such an action
independently. Alternatively, the Article proposes that Bankruptcy
Code section 506(c) could be amended to provide the statutory ba
sis for a procedure whereby third party claimants would possess in
dependent standing if the trustee refused to pursue a colorable
claim for section 506( c) expenses. Both solutions prevent secured
claimholders from unfairly benefitting from the efforts of parties
rendering services to the post-petition debtor.

